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Abstract
Record linkage refers to the task of integrating data from
two or more databases without a common identifier. MIND-
FIRL (MInimum Necessary Disclosure For Interactive Record
Linkage) is a software system that demonstrates the trade-
off between utility and privacy in interactive record linkage.
Due to the need to access personally identifiable information
(PII) to accurately assess whether different records refer to the
same person in heterogeneous databases, privacy is a major
concern in interactive record linkage. MINDFIRL supports in-
teractive record linkage while minimizing the privacy risk by
(1) using pseudonyms to separate the identifying information
from the sensitive information, (2) dynamically disclosing
only the minimum necessary information incrementally, as
needed on-demand at the point of decision, and (3) quantifies
the risk due to the needed information disclosure to support
transparency, the reasoning, communication, and decisions on
the privacy and utility trade off. In this paper we present an
overview of the MINDFIRL system and the k-Anonymized
Privacy Risk (KAPR) score used to measure the privacy risk
based on the disclosed information. We prove that KAPR
score is a norm meeting all the desirable properties for a risk
score for interactive record linkage.
1 Introduction
As data fuel the knowledge economy, appropriate collection
and use of personal data for better decisions is increasing
rapidly for all purposes including business, government, and
research. Yet, there are also increased concerns about indi-
vidual privacy leading to the need for improved methods in
private data analysis. Research on information privacy has
shown that, mathematically, private data analysis requires a
tradeoff between privacy and utility because all use of per-
sonal data leads to some privacy loss while providing some
utility in terms of data analysis. Yet, less is known about how
to make practical decisions on the privacy-utility tradeoff in
real applications that are often dependent on the specifics of
the data task and the data being used.
For record linkage and integration tasks that lack a common
identifier, fully-automated systems have limitations because
of the many data problems in real data such as duplicate
records, non-unique names, data errors in unique identifiers
(e.g., SSN), non-stable attributes (e.g., change in last name),
and valid similar identifiers for different people (e.g., twins,
Jr/Sr). Differentiating between whether two records are dupli-
cates of the same person or two near-identical records (e.g.,
as is often the case for twins) often requires additional infor-
mation gathering and human judgment. Most systems that are
used in practice are semi-automated interactive record-linkage
systems where human judgment is used to clean, standard-
ize, and manually resolve uncertain matches. Thus, privacy
becomes a major concern when humans are accessing person-
ally identifiable information (PII) for accurate record linkage.
In this demonstration, we present a system and method focus-
ing on privacy-utility tradeoff decisions in the task of record
linkage for integrating heterogeneous person-level databases
without a common identifier.
2 Related Work
Classic results in information privacy show that one cannot
answer more than an adversarially chosen set of n(logn)2
queries over a database of n bits such that each query has
o(
√
n) errors without the adversary being able to reconstruct
the original database [1]. This result poses a fundamental
limit on private data analyses and motivates the need to think
about private data analysis as a budget-constrained problem.
That is, each use of data leads to some privacy loss while pro-
viding some utility in terms of data analysis. This has led to a
rich body of literature on differential privacy as a method that
lets us concretely reason about privacy-budgeted data analy-
sis. In particular, many differentially private algorithms have
been proposed to answer low dimensional counting queries.
However, adoption of these methods in practice has been lim-
ited due in part to the wide variation in error rates, which are
dependent on the properties of the input data. To facilitate
adoption, Kotsogianis et al. have recently released PYTHIA,
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a software tool for learning the tradeoff between accuracy and
privacy in simple count queries [3]. MINDFIRL is a similar
software that supports learning the privacy and utility tradeoff
in interactive record linkage and provides optimal parameters
to control fine grained access via incremental information
disclosure.
Private record linkage (PRL) is the most common approach
to protecting privacy in record linkage. PRL allows the dis-
closure of the linked data to two parties while prohibiting
the disclosure of unlinked data to the other party or any third
party [8]. In PRL, an accurate linkage function is usually as-
sumed to be available, which dictates which data is linked and
thus can be shared. Thus, the basic goal of PRL is to securely
compute a known linkage function on encrypted data. The
main limitation of these methods is that, in practice, such link-
age functions are rarely known. Furthermore, there is no way
to evaluate the quality of the linkage results. Thus, adoption
of these methods in practice have been limited.
To overcome these issues, in our prior work, we proposed
the Privacy Preserving Interactive Record Linkage (PPIRL)
computational framework as a human-machine hybrid system
with specific utility and privacy requirements that allows hu-
man interaction while preserving information privacy during
the record linkage process [4]. The privacy objective of PPIRL
is to protect against sensitive attribute disclosure (e.g., cancer
status) and minimize identity disclosure while its utility ob-
jective is to generate the optimal matching function possible
by allowing for humans to fine tune the automated results by
interacting with the data. Such a computational framework
allows for the reasoning of the privacy and utility tradeoff in
record linkage. MINDFIRL is a software system that meets
all requirements of the PPIRL framework.
The dynamic visual interface for MINDFIRL was designed
based on a prior large user study (N=104) on information
requirements of interactive record linkage [5]. Using five
different static interfaces with variations on information dis-
closed and markups on the discrepancies in the data, we were
able to demonstrate the effectiveness of partial information
disclosure for record linkage decisions. We found that study
participants who viewed only 30% of data content had deci-
sion quality similar to those who had full 100% access. In ad-
dition, although quality of decision dropped significantly with
too little information, the study demonstrated that with proper
interface designs, many correct decisions can be made with
even legally de-identified data that is fully masked (74.5%
accuracy with fully-masked data compared to 84.1% with full
access).
3 Mindfirl
The MINDFIRL software supports interactive record link-
age via an on-demand information disclosure model and an
interactive visual interface for linkage decisions. The soft-
ware supports two user roles: manager and data worker. The
manager is the owner of the record linkage task (e.g., project
investigator), while the workers are the people who actually
work on the record linkage tasks (e.g., graduate students). The
manager can create record linkage tasks, import databases that
need to be linked, set up a privacy budget using the systems’s
privacy risk settings, and dispatch the task to workers. The
worker can then work on the record linkage task within the
privacy budget limit.
The record linkage problem-solving environment is shown
in Figure 1. The interface shows pairs of records that are
potential matches but with some level of uncertainty. The
worker can incrementally reveal additional data details as
needed to make better record linkage decisions. Each time
more information is opened, there is a cost associated with
the information being revealed, and this cost is subtracted
from the budget, as visually shown by meters on the top right
of the interface. During the interaction process, MINDFIRL
pre-calculates the privacy risk for all the next potential states.
Therefore, the worker can check the cost of revealing a cell
by hovering on the cell (e.g. orange box in last pair) and then
decide whether or not to reveal the additional details.
3.1 MINDFIRL Architecture
MINDFIRL uses the client server model. At any given time,
the client software only has the information that has been
revealed to the user and will need to request any additional
details from the server when the user requests it. This is to
prevent users hacking into the client software to see more
than is allowed.
An important property of the PPIRL computational frame-
work is that the privacy requirement states that the software
must guarantee no sensitive attribute disclosure (e.g., can-
cer status). MINDFIRL meets this requirement by using the
standard pseudonym mechanism to separate the sensitive at-
tribute from the identifying attributes via a random number.
The random number is managed by the software to construct
new linked data as needed without a person ever having to
interact with the computer generated number. The workers
completing the record linkage task only interact with the iden-
tifying attributes, such as ID, name, gender, race, and are never
shown the sensitive attributes. Once the record linkage is done,
MINDFIRL will provide the linked de-identified data for fur-
ther analysis, but this time with no identifying information.
3.2 On-Demand Incremental Disclosure
Combining individual level information (e.g., summation) is
the most common form of data manipulation to protect privacy
when details in the data reveal too much personal informa-
tion. In record linkage tasks, workers are often given a pair of
identifying records to determine if the two refer to the same
real world person by taking into account the discrepancies in
the two records. Thus, summarizing the pair of records into
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Figure 1: The user interface for the record linkage tasks in MINDFIRL
information about the discrepancy of the pair has the dual af-
fect of supporting good decision-making by distilling the raw
data into more useful information as well as protecting pri-
vacy by hiding the individual level data. Using this intuition,
we designed different display modes and markups to support
effective on-demand incremental information disclosures.
The system’s data display mode controls how the system
displays an attribute. Each attribute has three data display
modes: masked disclosure, partial disclosure, and full dis-
closure. In masked disclosure mode, all the characters are
masked by symbols. For partial disclosure mode, some char-
acters are masked while the other are shown based on the
type of the attribute and the actual discrepancy of the value in
the pair being reviewed for a linkage. In full disclosure mode,
all characters are disclosed. There are supplemental visual
markups to aid the user to know what the discrepancies are
to make a decision. These markups can indicate issues such
as missing values, differing values, identical values, swaps
between values, and string-edit operations between values [5].
How to mask or partially mask an attribute depends on the
attribute’s type. There are four types: fixed length string, vari-
able length string, date, and categorical. For example, for vari-
able string attributes such as a person’s name, the masked and
partially masked value is calculated by Damerau-Levenshtein
distance, which allows insertions, deletions, substitutions, and
transposition. For date attributes such as “DoB” (Date of
Birth), masked and partially disclosed modes include inter
and intra element discrepancies between year, month, and day.
Table 1 shows some examples of partially disclosed value for
different types of attributes.
At the beginning of the human interaction process, all the
information is fully masked (i.e., legally de-identified mode),
and the user can incrementally reveal the attributes as needed,
increasing the level of disclosure for the record pair.
4 Privacy Risk Score
In order to minimize the privacy risk associated with access
to PII, the presented on-demand disclosure method requires
a method for risk quantification. In this section, we define a
quantitative measure, called the k-Anonymized Privacy Risk
(KAPR) score, for the identity disclosure risk associated with
partial information disclosure. We illustrate by example how
KAPR is calculated, and we state and prove the desired prop-
erties of the measure.
4.1 Preliminaries
The attributes occurring in a data table can be categorized
into three non-disjoint sets:
1. identifiers (e.g. name, social security number), which
directly identify a person;
2. quasi-identifiers (e.g. gender, ZIP code, race), which can
be used to link records to external identifiers; and
3. sensitive attributes (e.g. disease status, income), whose
values for any individual must not be disclosed.
A standard approach to preserving privacy is deidentification,
which refers to removing the identifiers from the data before
sharing. This is not sufficient to guarantee anonymity, as quasi-
identifiers can potentially be used to link records to identify
records in other data sets, thereby causing identity disclosure
of individuals within the data set.
We use a privacy risk score based on k-anonymity [6, 7]
to measure the risk of identity disclosure. This property
places a restriction on the disclosure of identifiers and quasi-
identifiers.
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Definition 4.1. A data set is said to satisfy k-anonymity
for k > 1 if, for each combination of identifiers and quasi-
identifiers, at least k records exist in the data set sharing that
combination.
No person in a k-anonymous data set can be distinguished
from at least k− 1 other people, which helps guard against
identity disclosure (in other words, no particular person’s
data can be identified with certainty as belonging to them).
k-anonymity alone is not sufficient to protect against attribute
disclosure (e.g., cancer status) [2]. However, when protection
against attribute disclosure is guaranteed by separation of the
sensitive attributes from the identifiers, it can be leveraged
to create a useful measure for assessing the risk of identity
disclosure (some amount of which is inherent in the record
linkage context).
4.2 KAPR privacy risk score
Before defining the KAPR score, we formalize the concept
of a partial display.
Definition 4.2 (partial display). Let X be a data set with N
records and D non-sensitive attributes, containing potential
pairs of records to be linked. A partial display X is a set of 2n
rows and D attributes obtained from n≤ (N2) pairs of records
from X that are displayed to a user performing interactive
record linkage. The rows in X are many-to-one related to
the records in X . The values of the attributes in X may be
fully disclosed, partially disclosed or masked versions of the
corresponding attributes in X , as described in Table 1.
Underlying the partial displays is the closely related con-
cept of an information disclosure state, which in turn re-
quires the concepts of proportion of characters disclosed
and anonymity set size.
Definition 4.3 (proportion of characters disclosed). Let X be
a partial display comprising 2n rows and D attributes. Let the
number of characters of attribute j of record i be ni j. Let the
number of characters whose true values are disclosed be di j.
Then, the proportion of characters disclosed for attribute j of
record i is pi j := di j/ni j.
Definition 4.4 (anonymity set size). The anonymity set size
ki for a row ri in a partial display X , based on an underlying
data set X , is the number of records in X that could correspond
to ri, based on the level of disclosure in ri.
Definition 4.5 (information disclosure state). Let X be a par-
tial display comprising 2n rows and D attributes. Let pi j rep-
resent the proportion of characters of attribute j disclosed for
row i. Let ki be the size of the anonymity set of record i based
on the information that has been disclosed. The information
disclosure state of X is defined by the matrix X ∈ [0,1]2n×D,
with matrix elements Xi j := (pi j/ki) ∈ [0,1].
There is a many-to-one mapping from partial displays to
information disclosure states. We can now define KAPR as a
function of an information disclosure state.
Definition 4.6 (k-Anonymized Privacy Risk (KAPR) Score).
Let X be the information disclosure state associated with
a partial display X with 2n records and D attributes. Let
pi j be the proportion of characters of attribute j of record
i disclosed. Let κ be the minimum allowed anonymity set
size and let ki be the anonymity set size of record i based on
the current disclosure state. The k-Anonymized Privacy Risk
score (KAPR) is given by
K(κ;X) :=
κ
ND
‖X‖1,1 =
κ
ND
2n−1
∑
i=0
1
ki
D−1
∑
j=0
|pi j|. (1)
Here, ‖·‖1,1 is the standard L1,1 matrix norm.
4.3 Example
We illustrate the utility of KAPR via an example. Consider
Table 2, containing microdata about individual people, whose
schema comprises the identifier {Name}, the quasi-identifiers
{DOB, Race}, and the sensitive attribute {Income}. The data
linkage task to be accomplished is to merge duplicate records
in this data set. This is accomplished by having a worker man-
ually inspect all pairs of similar records and decide whether
or not they correspond to the same individual. In this exam-
ple, the ground truth is that records 1 and 2 belong to unique
individuals, while records 3 and 4 correspond to the same
individual (as indicated by the row colors). Because all of the
records in this table are quite similar, the user interface will
display every possible pair of records from this table to the
worker.
Initially, the pairs will be displayed in masked mode. This
corresponds to the information disclosure state depicted in
Table 3. The field ID contains a tuple denoting which records
from the base data set (Table 2) constitute this pair, and the
field i is used to label the rows of data displayed. Since
Income is a sensitive attribute, it will not be displayed. We de-
note by pi the vector whose entries consist of the proportions
of characters of the Name, DOB and Race fields respectively.
We denote by ki the size of the anonymity set for record i. In
principle, any number of the characters of Name and DOB can
be disclosed. Because Race is a Category variable, it can only
be not disclosed or fully disclosed; there is no option for par-
tial disclosure. In this mode, each row i in the display has an
anonymity set size of ki = 4, because the masked data could
correspond to any of the records in Table 2. However, no char-
acters of any of the three attributes are disclosed, meaning
pi = (0,0,0) for each row i, and hence Ki = 0 for each row
as well. Thus, the KAPR score for this information disclosure
state is 0.
The incremental display allows the user to reveal incremen-
tal additional information about any cell in the display, and
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Table 1: Example of display mode for different attributes
Attribute Type Masked Partial Full
ID String *********@ *********9 1742682819*****&**** *****6**** 1742668281
Name Varchar *******@@@ ******* JR SANCHEZ JR******* ******* SANCHEZ
DOB Date @@/&&/**** 08/09/**** 08/09/1964&&/@@/**** 09/08/**** 09/08/1964
Race Category @ N/A White& N/A Asian
Table 2: Fully disclosed individual-level attributes. Colors
indicate individuals (ground truth). There are three different
individuals; rows 3 and 4 correspond to the same individual.
ID Name DOB Race Income
1 Mary 08/09/1964 Hispanic 69,426
2 Mark 08/09/1964 Hispanic 38,001
3 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 27,998
4 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 27,989
the privacy cost of this action is quantified by the amount
by which the KAPR score is incremented as result. As an
example, the user may have decided to switch from masked
mode to partial mode for every cell in the display, as depicted
in Table 4. This will change the values of ki and pi for each
row. For example, for row i = 1, the size of the anonymity
set ki has decreased from 4 in masked mode to 3 in partial
mode, since we now know that the last character of Name is
‘y’, which means it must correspond to one of the three rows
where Name = ‘Mary’ in Table 2. Furthermore, we have now
revealed 1/4 of the characters of Name, but still no characters
of the other attributes, meaning pi = (1/4,0,0) now. In this
case, since N = 12, D = 3, this means that Ki = 1/432. The
value of Ki for each row is shown separately; for i ∈ {11,12},
Ki = 0 still, because the identifying attributes of the under-
lying records are identical, and thus no characters need be
revealed. The KAPR score for this information disclosure
state is ∑12i=1 Ki = 31/432 ≈ 0.072 > 0. So the KAPR score
has increased incrementally from 0 when every row was dis-
played in masked mode. It should be clear from the example
that the KAPR score for this information disclosure state
does not depend upon the order in which the information was
disclosed; regardless of the order in which the user clicked
the cells of the display to reveal more information, the final
information disclosure state is the same, and the KAPR score
depends only on the information disclosure state.
The maximum amount of information that can be revealed
is for every row to be displayed in full disclosure mode. This
information disclosure state is depicted in Table 5. In this state,
pi = (1,1,1) for every row i. Even in this fully disclosed state,
ki = 2 for some rows (the ones where the underlying record
is one of the two duplicates in the original record set with
respect to the identifying attributes). As a result, the KAPR
score is 0.750, which is less than the theoretical maximum
value of 1 for a data set without duplicates.
4.4 Properties of KAPR score
KAPR has several appealing and easily demonstrated proper-
ties that make it a useful measure of identity disclosure risk
for interactive record linkage.
Property 4.1. The KAPR score K :RN×D→R+ is a norm (it
is non-negative, homogeneous, and obeys the triangle inequal-
ity). Hence, it can be assigned the geometrical interpretation
of the “length” of the information disclosure state, where
“longer” means “higher risk of identity disclosure”.
Proof. This follows directly from Definition 4.6 and the fact
that κ/ND> 0, since a norm multiplied by a positive constant
is still a norm (it represents a uniform rescaling of all lengths).
Property 4.2. KAPR score manifestly depends only on the
information disclosure state, which in turn depends only on
the information displayed to the user, and not on the precise
sequence of actions taken by the user to lead to that state.
Property 4.3. KAPR score ranges from 0 (when no charac-
ters are disclosed, such as when every attribute is in masked
display mode) to 1 (when every character is disclosed and the
anonymity set size of every record in the underlying data set
is 1).
Proof. K ≥ 0 follows from KAPR being a norm. K ≤ 1
follows from the fact that ki ≥ κ, |pi j| ≤ 1 ⇒ |pi j|/ki ≤
∑N−1i=0 ∑
D−1
j=0 1/κ = ND/κ ⇒ K(κ;X) = (κ/ND)‖X‖1,1 ≤
1.
Property 4.4. KAPR score monotonically increases as more
characters are disclosed.
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Table 3: Masked pairs.
ID i Name DOB Race ki pi Ki
(1,2) 1 ***@ **/**/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
2 ***& **/**/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
(1,3) 3 **** *@/*&/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
4 **** *&/*@/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
(1,4) 5 **** *@/*&/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
6 **** *&/*@/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
(2,3) 7 ***@ *@/*&/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
8 ***& *&/*@/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
(2,4) 9 ***@ *@/*&/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
10 ***& *&/*@/**** N/A 4 (0, 0, 0) 0
(3,4) 11 **** **/**/**** N/A 4 (0,0,0) 0
12 **** **/**/**** N/A 4 (0,0,0) 0
K (= ∑i Ki) 0
Table 4: Partial disclosure.
ID i Name DOB Race ki pi Ki
(1,2) 1 ***y **/**/**** N/A 3 (1/4, 0, 0) 1/432
2 ***k **/**/**** N/A 1 (1/4, 0, 0) 1/144
(1,3) 3 **** *8/*9/**** N/A 1 (0, 2/8, 0) 1/144
4 **** *9/*8/**** N/A 2 (0, 2/8, 0) 1/288
(1,4) 5 **** *8/*9/**** N/A 1 (0, 2/8, 0) 1/144
6 **** *9/*8/**** N/A 2 (0, 2/8, 0) 1/288
(2,3) 7 ***k *8/*9/**** N/A 1 (1/4, 2/8, 0) 1/72
8 ***y *9/*8/**** N/A 2 (1/4, 2/8, 0) 1/144
(2,4) 9 ***k *8/*9/**** N/A 1 (1/4, 2/8, 0) 1/72
10 ***y *9/*8/**** N/A 2 (1/4, 2/8, 0) 1/144
(3,4) 11 **** **/**/**** N/A 3 (0,0,0) 0
12 **** **/**/**** N/A 3 (0,0,0) 0
K (= ∑i Ki) 0.072
Table 5: Full disclosure.
ID i Name DOB Race ki pi Ki
(1,2) 1 Mary 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
2 Mark 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
(1,3) 3 Mary 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
4 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
(1,4) 5 Mary 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
6 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
(2,3) 7 Mark 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
8 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
(2,4) 9 Mark 08/09/1964 Hispanic 1 (1,1,1) 1/12
10 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
(3,4) 11 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
12 Mary 09/08/1964 Black 2 (1,1,1) 1/24
K (= ∑i Ki) 0.750
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Proof. Consider the partial derivative of K(κ,X) with respect
to any of the pi j: ∂K∂pi j =
κ
ND ∑r,s
1
kr
∂|pi j |
∂prs =
κ
ND ∑r,s
1
kr
δirδ js =
κ
ND
1
ki
> 0. Thus, KAPR always increases with disclosure of
new characters.
Property 4.5. The KAPR score penalty for disclosing at-
tribute values for any particular record is a monotonically
decreasing function of the anonymity set size for the record.
Proof. Suppose characters from attribute j of record i are
disclosed. From the proof of Property 4.4 above, ∂K∂pi j =
κ
ND
1
ki
.
This is a decreasing function of ki, the anonymity set size of
record i. Moreover, disclosure can only decrease or maintain
the anonymity set size, so a given disclosure that causes a
reduction in the anonymity set size causes a greater increase
in KAPR than the same disclosure would if the anonymity set
size was preserved.
5 Conclusion
Integrating data records from multiple databases is crucial for
many applications and research. Interactive record linkage is
often used to ensure high linking quality. Therefore, there has
been increasing concerns about privacy on interactive record
linkage. We proposed a measurement called KAPR to quan-
tify the privacy risk for interactive record linkage projects, and
showed how it meet the desired properties. By using KAPR,
data custodians and researchers can better communicate and
agree on the optimal trade-off point for legitimate access to
data and privacy protection.
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